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Abstract
We construct a model of policy reform in which two players continually search
for Pareto improving policies. The players have imperfect control over the pro-
posals that are considered. Inefficient gridlock takes place due to the difficulty
in finding moderate policies. The reform process is path dependent, with early
agreements determining long-run outcomes. The process may also be cyclical,
as players alternate between being more and less accommodating. Our model
provides a noncooperative foundation for the “Raiffa path”.
Keywords: collective search, bargaining, path dependence, cycling, endoge-
nous status quo, Raiffa path, gridlock, delay, inefficiency.
∗We are grateful to Nageeb Ali, David Baron, Steven Callander, Gabriel Carroll, and Bart Lipman
for their feedback.
†Acharya: avidit@stanford.edu, Ortner: jortner@bu.edu.
1
1 Introduction
Policy reform is a complicated process. The agents involved typically have imperfect
control over the scope and direction of reform. One reason for this is that they must
search for ideas upon which to build reform proposals, and it is hard to anticipate which
ideas this search process yields and when. As Binder and Lee (2013) write:
“The search for win-win solutions is labor-intensive. Information must be
gathered from many sources—for example, interest groups, affected indus-
tries, policy experts, activists, and government agencies—before members
and their staffs can understand the causes and dimensions of a policy prob-
lem and see a pathway to possible solutions.” (p. 59)
In fact, it is not uncommon to have third parties like think-tanks, lobbyists, non-
governmental organizations, and interest groups contributing their diverse views to the
development of a reform proposal. To learn the full implications of the legislation that
they put forward, policy-makers often have to wait until the final reform bill is made
public and evaluated by experts, the media, and nonpartisan organizations.1
In this paper, we develop a tractable model of policy reform that accounts for the
difficulty that policy-makers face when developing reform proposals, and we use it to
study the dynamics of policy reform. The model is a two player complete information
game played over a large finite number of periods. The set of feasible policies is the
simplex X = {x ∈ R2+ : x1 + x2 ≤ 1}. At each period t, player i = 1, 2 obtains a flow
payoff equal to the coordinate xti of the policy x
t = (xt1, x
t
2) that is in place. The policy in
place at the start of the game is (0, 0). In each period, a new policy is drawn randomly
from the set of policies that are Pareto improvements to the policy last period, and
players sequentially decide whether to approve or disapprove the draw. The previous
period policy is replaced if and only if both players approve the change; otherwise, it
remains in place. Players share a common discount factor δ < 1. The randomness of
the offers captures the complexities in developing reform proposals.
This model with randomly generated policy policies can be interpreted as a bargain-
ing model in which it is difficult for players to know in advance the payoff consequences
of their proposals— a natural assumption when the issue over which players are bar-
gaining is complex, and they have to wait to discover good ideas on how to improve
1The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is an example of a nonpartisan organization that evaluates
the budgetary consequences of bills, but there are numerous others.
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existing agreements. Examples of such complex issues outside the legislative context
include international climate change agreements, trade negotiations, and negotiations
over international conflicts.
Our analysis delivers a clean equilibrium characterization. In any period, the set of
policies that both players find acceptable is a cone defined by two lines with positive
slope that pass through the last period’s policy as its vertex. Figure 1 depicts the
first two “acceptance cones” for a possible sequence of policies {x1,x2,x3,x4, ...} that
are approved along the path of play. Policies that lie outside the acceptance cone are
rejected even if they are Pareto superior to the status quo. The reason for this is that
players cannot commit to approve future policies that disproportionally benefit their
opponents. As a result, a player strictly prefers to reject Pareto superior offers that
yield a substantial improvement to her opponent, but only a mild improvement for her,
since she (correctly) anticipates that approving such a policy will “close the door” in the
future to many policies that she finds attractive.
Since players discount the future, the periods of inaction produced by the rejection
of Pareto improving policies generate inefficiency. However, this inaction and ineffi-
ciency are not produced by institutional constraints to reform, such as supermajority
requirements and the existence of veto players, that are traditionally highlighted in the
policymaking literature (see, e.g., Brady and Volden, 1998, Krehbiel, 2010). Instead,
they result in our model simply due to the difficulty in finding moderate policies.
As Figure 1 shows, a distinctive feature of our model is that players will typically
reach a sequence of “interim” agreements, gradually approaching the Pareto frontier.
In addition, the randomness of draws and the rigidity of the status quo in our model
together imply that the policy reform process is path dependent. In each period, the
set of policies that players find acceptable depends on the current status quo. As a
result, at each point in time the future path of play depends crucially on the policies
that players agreed on at early stages of the reform process. Such path dependence has
been highlighted as an important feature of policy evolution by, for example, Pierson
(2004) and Hacker (2002).
Path dependence in our model disappears, however, as the players become fully pa-
tient (δ → 1). In this case, the acceptance cone collapses to a line segment connecting
the status quo to a point on the frontier: only policies on this line segment are imple-
mented on the path of play. Intuitively, the cost in terms of forgone future payoff of
implementing a policy that is more beneficial to one’s opponent increases with δ. In the
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Figure 1: Path of play
limit, the only policies that both players accept are those that give a payoff vector on
this line segment. When policies are drawn from a symmetric distribution, the long run
policy converges to an equal split of the surplus. In this case, the path that the equi-
librium induces when players are arbitrarily patient coincides with the “Raiffa path”;
i.e., the path of policies proposed in Raiffa (1953) as a plausible outcome in settings in
which the bargaining parties engage in step-by-step negotiations.
Lastly, we show that our model may give rise to reform cycles, under which periods
of high and low likelihood of agreements alternate. Given a status quo policy, the
acceptance cone may be narrow in some periods but wide in others, following a cyclical
pattern. These cycles are driven not by changes in fundamentals, but by self-fulfilling
changes in the players’ expectations about future play. This feature of our equilibrium
resonates with observations made by historians like Schlesinger (1949), who suggest that
the appetite for policy reform is cyclical, and these cycles are often difficult to explain
by changes in fundamentals.
Our baseline model is one in which players have no control over the offer that is
generated. In this sense, our model lies at the opposite extreme of the standard approach
to bargaining theory (e.g. Rubinstein (1982) and Baron and Ferejohn (1989)) in which
proposers have full control over the payoff consequences of their proposals. A natural
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extension of our model is to the intermediate case in which proposers have partial control
over the payoff consequences of the offers they put on the table. We consider such an
extension in which, at each period, a randomly chosen proposer chooses the distribution
from which the policy will be drawn. Our main results carry through in this environment.
Related Literature– Our paper is primarily related to the literature on collective
search, e.g., Compte and Jehiel (2010), Albrecht et al. (2010), Roberts (2007) and Penn
(2009). Compte and Jehiel (2010) and Albrecht et al. (2010) study models in which a
group of agents sequentially sample alternatives from a distribution and have to choose
when to stop. Closer to our model, Roberts (2007) and Penn (2009) also study settings
with randomly generated alternatives and with an endogenously evolving status-quo.
Roberts (2007) and Penn (2009) consider settings with supermajority rules and focus
on how the dynamic nature of the problem affects players’ voting behavior when the
set of available policies lie all on the Pareto frontier. In contrast, we consider a setting
with unanimity and focus on understanding the process by which policy approaches the
Pareto frontier.2
The rigidity of the status quo relates our model to the growing literature on political
bargaining with an endogenous status quo (e.g., Kalandrakis (2004), Duggan and Ka-
landrakis (2012), Dziuda and Loeper (2016)). In contrast to these studies, we consider a
setting in which policy-makers bargain over complex issues, and have imperfect control
over the offers that are generated.
Because players in our model approach the Pareto frontier in incremental steps, our
paper relates to prior work on incremental bargaining and partial agreements. Compte
and Jehiel (2004) study a bargaining model in which each players’ outside option depends
on the history of offers. In this setting players begin negotiations making incompatible
offers, and make gradual concessions over time. However, there are no interim agree-
ments in their model: the first agreement that players reach is a point on the Pareto
frontier. More recently, Acharya and Ortner (2013) analyze a model in which two players
bargain over two issues, one of which will only be open for negotiation at a future date.
The main result is that players may reach a partial agreement on the first issue, only to
complete the agreement when the second issue becomes available.
2In addition to this collective search literature, our paper also shares the spirit of Callander (2011),
who also considers a setting of policy-making in complex environments. Callander (2011) focuses on
how policy-makers learn about the payoff consequences of different policies from previous experiences.
In contrast, bargainers in our model can fully evaluate the payoff consequences of the policies that they
vote on. The complexity of the environment in our model is instead captured by the players’ inability
to draft policies that will deliver particular payoffs.
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Our result on commitment and inefficiency relates our paper to the literature on
bargaining failures as a result of commitment problems; e.g., Fearon (1996), Powell
(2004, 2006), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001), Ortner (2017). These papers focus
on understanding the conditions under which the players’ inability to commit will result
in bargaining inefficiencies. Instead, we focus on how the players’ inability to commit
shapes the evolution of policy towards the Pareto frontier.
Finally, our result on the Raiffa path relates our paper to others that also provide
foundations for this bargaining solution. Livne (1989), Peters and Van Damme (1991),
Diskin et al. (2011) and Samet (2009) provide axiomatizations for the Raiffa path. Myer-
son (2013), Trockel (2011) and Diskin et al. (2011) provide noncooperative foundations
by proposing bargaining models in the tradition of Rubinstein (1982). These models
have the property that, in the first round, players reach an agreement at the point at
which the Raiffa path intersects the Pareto frontier.3 In contrast to these studies, our
model gives rise to interim agreements, therefore providing foundations for the path.
2 Model
2.1 The policy reform game
Two players, i = 1, 2, play the following policy reform game. Time is discrete, with an
infinite horizon, and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, .... A policy is a pair
x = (x1, x2) ∈ X := {(y1, y2) ∈ R2+ : y1 + y2 ≤ 1}.
In each of the first T < ∞ periods, players jointly decide whether to move policy from
the current-period status quo zt = (zt1, z
t
2) ∈ X to a new policy x drawn randomly from
a distribution Fzt with density fzt and full support over the set
X(zt) := {x ∈ X : xi ≥ zti for i = 1, 2}
of Pareto superior policies to zt. After the new policy x is drawn, the two players
sequentially decide whether or not to accept it. If both players accept it, then the policy
in place in period t becomes the new policy, so xt = x. Otherwise, the status quo is
implemented, so xt = zt. The next period’s status quo is the previous period policy, so
3In Myerson (2013), players reach an agreement that is “close” to the point at which the Raiffa
path intersects the Pareto frontier.
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zt+1 = xt with z0 = (0, 0). For all periods t ≥ T + 1 the players cannot change policy, so
xt = xT . We refer to the final reform period T as the deadline, and we will be interested
in studying the limiting case of T →∞.
Both players are expected utility maximizers and share a common discount factor
δ < 1. If xt = (xt1, x
t
2) ∈ X is the policy in place in period t, then player i earns a flow
payoff xti at time t. Player i’s payoff from a sequence of policies {xt}∞t=1 is thus
Ui
({xt}) = (1− δ) ∞∑
t=0
δtxti.
This describes the policy reform game with finite deadline T . We focus on the
subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) of this game.
The following result is established by backward induction. Its proof, and all other
proofs, appear in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. The policy reform game with deadline T has an SPE. Moreover, all
SPE of the policy reform game with deadline T generate the same expected payoffs.
2.2 Recursive equilibrium characterization
For any z ∈ X and any x ∈ X(z), let
Pz(x) :=
(
x1 − z1
1− z1 − z2 ,
x2 − z2
1− z1 − z2
)
(1)
Pz is a mapping that projects points in X(z) onto X. We make the following assumption
on the distributions Fzt from which policies are drawn.
Assumption 1. For every policy z ∈ X, the density fz satisfies
fz(x) =
1
(1− z1 − z2)2f(Pz(x)) ∀x ∈ X(z)
where f := f(0,0) is the density from which policies are drawn at the start of the game. In
addition, there are constants f, f with f > f > 0, such that f(x) ∈ [f, f ] for all x ∈ X.
Assumption 1 states that, for any z ∈ X, the distribution Fz over X(z) from which
policies are drawn when the status quo is z is “identical” to the distribution F := F(0,0)
over X from which policies are drawn at the start of the game. We maintain this
assumption throughout the rest of the paper. Its main implication is that a subgame
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starting at period t ≤ T with status quo policy z ∈ X is strategically equivalent to a
game with deadline T − t starting at policy z0 = (0, 0).
To formalize this, for any deadline T , time t ≤ T and policy z ∈ X, let Vi(z, t;T )
be the continuation payoff that player i obtains under an SPE at a subgame starting at
period t when the status quo is zt = z. Let Wi(T ) = Vi((0, 0), 0;T ) be player i’s SPE
payoff at the start of a game. Then, we have:
Lemma 1. For all t ≤ T and all possible values of the status quo zt = z = (z1, z2) ∈ X,
the players’ equilibrium payoffs satisfy
Vi(z, t;T ) = zi + (1− z1 − z2)Wi(T − t) for i = 1, 2. (2)
When the status quo at time t is z, player i’s equilibrium payoff is equal to the flow
payoff zi, that the player is guaranteed to get forever (by the persistence of the status
quo), plus the payoff (1− z1 − z2)Wi(T − t) that the player obtains from bargaining for
T − t periods over the remaining surplus of size 1− z1 − z2.
We use Lemma 1 to provide a recursive characterization of the players’ equilibrium
payoffs. Note first that, at the last period T , players accept any policy in X(zT ), where
zT is the status quo policy. Consider next a period t < T at which the status quo policy
is z = (z1, z2) ∈ X. Then, player i approves a policy x = (x1, x2) ∈ X(z) only if
(1− δ)xi + δVi(x, t+ 1;T ) ≥ (1− δ)zi + δVi(z, t+ 1;T ). (3)
Let Wi = Wi(T − t − 1). Then using (2) in both sides of (3) and rearranging, player i
accepts policy x when the status quo is z only if xi ≥ `i,z(x−i|Wi), where
`i,z(x−i|Wi) := zi + δWi
1− δWi (x−i − z−i)
`i,z(x−i|Wi) is the line in (xi, x−i)-space with slope δWi/(1 − δWi) that passes through
the status quo z. Define
Ai,z(Wi) := {x ∈ X(z) : xi ≥ `i,z(x−i|Wi)} .
Then, for any pair of payoffs W = (W1,W2) and for any z ∈ X, the set
Az(W) := A1,z(W1) ∩ A2,z(W2) (4)
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is the set of policy draws that are accepted by both players at period t < T when
the status quo policy is z and (W1(T − t − 1),W2(T − t − 1)) = (W1,W2). When
1 > δ(W1 +W2), the line `1,z(x2|W1) has steeper slope than `2,z(x1|W2) in (x1, x2)-space
and Az(W) is a cone with vertex z. For any pair of values W we let A(W) := A(0,0)(W)
be the cone with vertex (0, 0). Such a cone is depicted in Figure 2.
For any integer T > 0, let W(T ) = (W1(T ),W2(T )) be the players’ SPE payoffs in a
game with deadline T . By our arguments above, a policy draw is accepted at the initial
period if and only if it is in the set A(W(T−1)) with W(T−1) = (W1(T−1),W2(T−1)).
Therefore, player i’s payoff at the start of the game is
Wi(T ) = prob(x ∈ A(W(T − 1)))E[(1− δ)xi + δVi(x, 1;T )|x ∈ A(W(T − 1))]
+ prob(x /∈ A(W(T ))[(1− δ)0 + δVi((0, 0), 1;T )]
= prob(x ∈ A(W(T − 1)))E[xi − (x1 + x2)δWi(T − 1)|x ∈ A(W(T − 1))] + δWi(T − 1),
where the second line follows from equation (2).
Define the operator Φ = (Φ1,Φ2) : X → X, where for every payoff pair W =
(W1,W2) ∈ X and for i = 1, 2,
Φi(W) := prob(x ∈ A(W))E[xi − (x1 + x2)δWi|x ∈ A(W)] + δWi, (5)
Let Φt(W) denote the t-th iteration of operator Φ over the pair W = (W1,W2).
Proposition 2. In a policy reform game with deadline T ,
(i) the players’ equilibrium payoffs satisfy W(T ) = ΦT+1((0, 0)), and
(ii) the set of policies that are accepted by both players in any period t ≤ T is Azt(W(T−
t−1)) where zt is the status quo policy in period t and W(T−t−1) are the players’
equilibrium payoffs in the policy reform game with deadline T − t− 1.
Figure 2 plots the acceptance region A(W) at the initial period of the game. As the
figure shows, policies that constitute a Pareto improvement over the initial policy (0, 0)
and that lie outside A(W) are rejected, leading to inefficient outcomes.
The commitment problem lies at the heart of these inefficiencies. To see why, suppose
that in period 0 policy x > (0, 0) in Figure 2 is drawn. Policy x Pareto dominates the
initial policy, but if x were to be implemented, then starting in period 1 the set of
policies Ax(W) that both players accept would be the area inside the dashed lines in
9
Figure 2: Acceptance region A(W).
Figure 2. These policies are significantly worse for player 2 than the policies that could
be implemented in the future if the status quo (0, 0) remains in place. So player 2
strictly prefers to maintain policy (0, 0) than to implement x. Player 2 would approve
policy x if player 1 could commit to accepting policies that are beneficial for player 2 in
the future, bringing the trajectory of policy reform back towards the center. However,
player 2 rightly anticipates that player 1 would not accept such policies in the future if
policy x were to be implemented today.
3 Infinite horizon limit
Throughout this section, we study the properties of the equilibrium in the limit as the
deadline T approaches ∞.
Definition 1. We say that the equilibrium is convergent if the sequence {W(T )} =
{ΦT (0)} converges as T →∞. Otherwise, we say that the equilibrium is cycling.
Section 3.1 studies conditions under which equilibrium is convergent. Section 3.2 dis-
cusses some properties of convergent equilibria. Section 3.3 provides conditions under
which equilibrium is cycling.
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3.1 Conditions for convergence
The iterative characterization of equilibrium payoffs in Proposition 2 suggests that if the
sequence of payoffs {W(T )} converges in T , then the limit is a fixed point of Φ. This is
confirmed by the following lemma.
Lemma 2. (i) Φ has a fixed point, and
(ii) if the sequence of payoffs {W(T )} converges to W, then W is a fixed point of Φ.
Our next result presents sufficient conditions for equilibrium to be convergent. In
particular, it shows that equilibrium is convergent whenever players are patient enough.
Proposition 3. There exists a threshold δ < 1 such that if δ > δ the equilibrium is
convergent.
Symmetric distributions. We now study conditions under which payoffs converge
for the special case where F is symmetric about the 45◦ line, i.e. when its density f
satisfies f(x1, x2) = f(x2, x1) for all (x1, x2) ∈ X.
We start by noting that, when F is symmetric, both players get the same equilibrium
payoffs: for all T , W(T ) = (W1(T ),W2(T )) is such that W1(T ) = W2(T ) =: W (T ). A
formal proof of this statement is given in Lemma A.2 in the Appendix.
For all T let Wˆ (T ) = 2W (T ) be the sum of the players’ equilibrium payoffs in a
game with deadline T . With a slight abuse of notation, let A(Wˆ ) be the acceptance
region when W = (Wˆ/2, Wˆ /2). We define the operator Ψ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] as follows: for
all Wˆ ,
Ψ(Wˆ ) := Φ1((Wˆ/2, Wˆ /2)) + Φ2((Wˆ/2, Wˆ /2))
= prob(x ∈ A(Wˆ ))E[x1 + x2|x ∈ A(Wˆ )](1− δWˆ ) + δWˆ (6)
It then follows from Proposition 2 that when F is symmetric, Wˆ (T ) = ΨT+1(0).
Our next result provides a sufficient condition for equilibrium to be convergent in
the especial case in which F is symmetric.
Proposition 4. Suppose F is symmetric. Then, if Ψ′(Wˆ ) > −1 for all Wˆ ∈ [0, 1], the
equilibrium is convergent.
To get a sense as to when the condition in Proposition 4 holds, define
H(Wˆ ) := prob(x ∈ A(Wˆ ))E[x1 + x2|x ∈ A(Wˆ )], (7)
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so that
Ψ(Wˆ ) = H(Wˆ )(1− δWˆ ) + δWˆ , and
Ψ′(Wˆ ) = δ(1−H(Wˆ )) +H ′(Wˆ )(1− δWˆ ). (8)
Note that H ′(Wˆ ) < 0, and that the magnitude of this derivative depends on how much
mass the distribution F puts on the boundary of the acceptance set: |H ′(Wˆ )| is large
when F puts significant mass on the boundary of A(Wˆ ). Since δ(1 − H(Wˆ )) > 0, the
condition in Proposition 4 holds whenever the distribution F is sufficiently “dispersed.”
Example 1. Assume F is a uniform distribution over X. In this case, for any Wˆ ∈ [0, 1],
Ψ(Wˆ ) = δWˆ +
2
3
(1− δWˆ )2.
Note that Ψ′(Wˆ ) = δ
3
(−1 + 4δWˆ ) > −1, so by Proposition 4 the equilibrium is conver-
gent. Payoffs W(T ) = (W1(T ),W2(T )) converge to W = (W1,W2), where for i = 1, 2,
Wi =
1
8δ2
(3 + δ −
√
9 + 6δ − 15δ2).
We note that, as δ → 1, equilibrium payoffs W converge to (1/2, 1/2).
3.2 Properties of convergent equilibria
In this section, we assume that the equilibrium is convergent, so W(T ) converges to some
W = Φ(W). We derive several properties of the equilibrium in the limit as T →∞.
We start by noting that, when W(T ) converges to some W = (W1,W2) ∈ X,
each acceptance set Axτ (W) is a cone with vertex x
τ , defined by two lines with slopes
δW1/(1 − δW1) and (1 − δW2)/δW2 that pass through the vertex (see Figure 2). This
means that in the infinite horizon limit, the lines defining all of the acceptance cones are
parallel, so the acceptance cones are nested.
Lemma 3. (nested acceptance cones) Let {xt}∞t=0 be a realized sequence of equilibrium
policies. Then,
Ax0(W) ⊇ Ax1(W) ⊇ Ax2(W) ⊇ ...
Lemma 3 implies that there exist policies that are acceptable at some period t, but
become no longer acceptable at period t + 1 despite also being Pareto improvements
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relative to the t + 1 status quo policy zt+1.4 Players don’t implement some policy
reforms that they would have previously accepted. Figure 1 illustrates this feature of
the equilibrium, by showing the acceptance cones for policies (0, 0) and x1 > (0, 0).
Long-run outcomes. The game essentially ends when players implement a policy
x ∈ X on the Pareto frontier: if policy x ∈ X with x1 + x2 = 1 is implemented at time
t, then xτ = x for all periods τ ≥ t. We therefore call a policy x on the Pareto frontier
a long-run outcome of the game. The game’s unique equilibrium induces a distribution
G over long-run outcomes; i.e., over points on the frontier. For any subgame starting
with status-quo policy z ∈ X, the continuation equilibrium at that subgame induces
a distribution Gz over long-run outcomes. The next result summarizes some notable
features of convergent equilibria, including that the distribution over long run outcomes
changes along the path of play, and exhibits path dependence.
Proposition 5. Suppose the equilibrium is convergent. Then,
(i) (long run distribution) for any z ∈ X, the support of distribution Gz is suppGz =
{y ∈ X : y1 + y2 = 1} ∩ Az(W);
(ii) (path dependence) Gz 6= Gz′ for all z′ 6= z;
(iii) (gradual certainty) For every sequence of equilibrium policies {xτ}∞τ=0, suppGxτ+1 ⊆
suppGxτ , with strict inclusion whenever x
τ+1 6= xτ .
In the first period, any policy x on the Pareto frontier with x1 ∈ [δW1, 1− δW2] lies
in the support of G = G(0,0). As play progresses and the players implement policies that
are closer to the Pareto frontier, the support of the long-run distribution shrinks. Figure
1 shows the support of Gx1 for some policy x
1 on the path of play.
Patient players and the Raiffa path. We now study equilibrium behavior when
players become arbitrarily patient; i.e., when δ → 1. We note that, by Proposition 3,
the equilibrium is convergent whenever δ is larger than some threshold δ.
For each δ ∈ (δ, 1), we let Wδ = (W δ1 ,W δ2 ) denote the players’ limiting payoffs as
T → ∞ in a game with discount factor δ. We let Gδ denote the distribution over long
run outcomes in the limiting equilibrium with discount factor δ.
4Formally, there exist policies x > xτ such that x ∈ Axt(W)\Axτ (W) for τ > t.
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Proposition 6. Fix a sequence {δn} → 1, and a corresponding sequence of equilibrium
payoffs {Wδn}. Then,
(i) (determinism) Gδn converges to a dirac measure on (W ∗1 ,W
∗
2 ) := lim
n→∞
(W δn1 ,W
δn
2 );
(ii) (generalized Raiffa path) lim
n→∞
A(Wδn) = {x ∈ X : x1/x2 = W ∗1 /W ∗2 };
(iii) (efficiency) lim
n→∞
W δn1 +W
δn
2 = 1.
Moreover, if F is symmetric, W ∗1 = W
∗
2 = 1/2.
Proposition 6(i) says that as δ → 1 the path of play approaches deterministically a
particular long run outcome, namely the players’ equilibrium payoff split. Proposition
6(ii) says that, as δ → 1, the set of policies that both players find acceptable converges
to the line segment connecting (0, 0) and the point (W ∗1 ,W
∗
2 ). Intuitively, the cost in
terms of forgone future payoff of implementing a policy that is more beneficial to your
opponent increases with δ. In the limit, the only policies that both players accept are
those that give both players a payoff on this line segment. This implies that, as players
become arbitrarily patient, there is no path dependence. Lastly, Proposition 6(iii) shows
that the inefficiency of delay vanishes as players become infinitely patient. This occurs
in spite of the fact that, as δ → 1, the acceptance region A(Wδ) converges to a straight
line, and so the probability of changing the policy in any given period goes to zero.
In general, the long-run agreement (W ∗1 ,W
∗
2 ) depends on the distribution F . Propo-
sition 6 establishes that in the special case in which the distribution is symmetric, both
players obtain the same payoff, so (W ∗1 ,W
∗
2 ) = (1/2, 1/2). As a result, when F is sym-
metric, the path of play that our model induces in the limit as δ → 1 is closely related to
the sequential bargaining solution proposed by Raiffa (1953). Indeed, in our framework,
Raiffa’s sequential bargaining solution is the segment with slope 1 that connects the
origin with the point (1/2, 1/2) on the Pareto frontier.5
3.3 Cycling equilibrium
We now turn to cycling equilibria. We start by providing some intuition as to why the
equilibrium may be cycling.
5More generally, Raiffa’s bargaining solution is the segment connecting the disagreement payoff with
the Pareto frontier, and passing through the utopia payoff vector; i.e., the payoff vector that would result
if each player obtained her preferred outcome. In our environment, the utopia payoff vector is (1, 1).
14
Note that players in our model trade off implementing a Pareto improving policy
today against the benefit of waiting to see if they can move policy in a more preferred
direction tomorrow. At the deadline T , there is no benefit to waiting so the players
accept every policy in X(zT ). In the second to last period, however, players are less
accommodating, since they anticipate that the set of acceptable policies tomorrow will
depend on the policy they implement today. Graphically, the acceptance cone becomes
smaller (narrower) at period T − 1, and some extreme policies in X(zT ) are rejected.
Consider next period T − 2. If the probability of changing the policy next period
is sufficiently small (i.e., if the distribution F places little mass on the acceptance cone
tomorrow), players know that they are unlikely to enact a reform in the next period,
and, in all likelihood, will have to wait until the final period to change policy. Since
waiting for two periods is more costly than waiting only one period, players are more
accommodating in period T − 2 than they are in period T − 1.
The arguments above suggests that payoffs W(T ) may cycle for small values of T .
We now show that they may also cycle in the limit as T →∞.
To provide simple conditions under which such cycling occurs, we focus on the case
in which the distribution F is symmetric. Recall from the discussion in Section 3.1 that
when F is symmetric, the players have the same equilibrium payoffs and the sum of
these payoffs is the (T + 1)-th iteration over 0 of the operator Ψ defined in (6).
Proposition 7. If F is symmetric then Ψ has a unique fixed point Wˆ ∗. If, in addition,
(i) Ψ(Wˆ ) 6= Wˆ ∗ for all Wˆ 6= Wˆ ∗, and
(ii) there exists ε > 0 such that Ψ′(Wˆ ) ≤ −1 for all Wˆ ∈ [Wˆ ∗ − ε, Wˆ ∗ + ε],
then the equilibrium is cycling.
For some intuition as to when the conditions in Proposition 7 hold, recall that
equations (7) and (8) define the operator Ψ and its derivative Ψ′. The magnitude of
H ′(Wˆ ) < 0 depends on how much mass the distribution F puts on the boundary of the
acceptance set A(Wˆ ). Hence, Proposition 7 holds when distribution F places significant
mass at the boundary of A(Wˆ ) for all Wˆ close to the fixed point Wˆ ∗.
Under the conditions in Proposition 7, the players’ equilibrium payoffs Wˆ (τ)/2 cycle
around Wˆ ∗/2. Note that, in the symmetric case, the acceptance region Az(Wˆ ) is a cone
with vertex z and lines with slopes 1−δWˆ/2
δWˆ/2
and δWˆ/2
1−δWˆ/2 . Therefore, the fact that payoffs
Wˆ (τ)/2 cycle around Wˆ ∗/2 implies that there will be an alternation between periods of
high and low probability of agreement; i.e., the equilibrium features cycles.
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We now present an example to make the cycling result more concrete. The example
also shows that the period of the cycle can vary with the parameters. For expositional
purposes, we consider an example in which distribution F is discrete.6
Example 2. Suppose F is such that
probF (x = (1/2, 1/4)) = probF (x = (1/4, 1/2)) = 1/2.
Note that,
Ψ(Wˆ ) =
{
δWˆ if Wˆ > 1
3δ
,
3
4
(1− δWˆ ) + δWˆ if Wˆ ≤ 1
3δ
.
Indeed, when Wˆ > 1
3δ
, players’ continuation values are too high and the set of accept-
able policies has no mass under F . When Wˆ ≤ 1
3δ
, the set of acceptable policies has
probability 1. If δ = 0.5, then the equilibrium converges as T → ∞ to a two-period
cycle where the payoffs alternate between Wˆ = 0.4 and Wˆ = 0.8. If δ = 0.75 then
the equilibrium converges as T →∞ to a four-period cycle where the payoffs alternate
between Wˆ = 0.458, Wˆ = 0.344, Wˆ = 0.814 and Wˆ = 0.611.
4 Discussion
4.1 Strategic Search
Our model, with random proposals, is intended to capture complexities in the environ-
ment that make it difficult for players to gauge the payoff consequences of their proposals.
In this section, we present a natural extension of our framework in which players have
some ability to influence the direction in which they will search for new policies.
As we mentioned in the introduction, our model can be interpreted as a bargaining
model in which the proposer has no control over the offer that is generated; and, in this
sense, our model lies at the opposite extreme of the standard approach to bargaining
theory in which proposers have full control over the proposals that are considered. The
extension we present in this section bridges the gap between the traditional approach
and our baseline model by allowing proposers to have partial control over the payoff
6Two points are worth noting. First, Propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold when F is discrete.
Second, if we endow the space of distributions with the sup norm, operator Φ(W) is continuous in the
distribution F . Hence, Example 2 can be approximated by a sequence of continuous distributions {Fn}
converging to the discrete distribution.
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consequences of the offers they put on the table. We briefly describe the model here. A
formal treatment appears in Appendix B.
Two players, i = 1, 2, play the following game. Time is discrete and indexed by
t = 0, 1, 2, .... The set of policies is X, and players have the same preferences over
policies as in our baseline model. At each period t = 0, 1, ..., T , player i = 1, 2 is
recognized with probability 1/2. The recognized player chooses a distribution from a
finite set of distributions Fzt , where zt is the current status quo policy. We assume that
each distribution in Fz has a density whose support is X(z).
After the new policy x is drawn from the chosen distribution, the two players se-
quentially decide whether or not to accept it. If both players accept it, then the policy
in place in period t becomes the new policy, so xt = x. Otherwise, the status quo is
implemented, so xt = zt. The status quo at time t + 1 is the previous period policy, so
zt+1 = xt. For all periods t ≥ T + 1 the players cannot change policy, so xt = xT . As in
our baseline model, for any deadline T , this game can be solved by backward induction,
and all equilibria generate the same expected payoffs.
We make the following assumptions about the sets of distributions Fx. First, we
assume that, for all x,y ∈ X, card(Fx) = card(Fy); i.e., all the sets Fx have the
same cardinality. Second, for all x ∈ X and all Fx ∈ Fx with density fx, there exists
F ∈ F = F(0,0) with density f such that fx(y) = f(Px(y)) for all y ∈ X(x). Moreover,
for all x ∈ X, f(x) ∈ [f, f ] for some f > f > 0. Note that this assumption is a
generalization of Assumption 1 to the current environment.
In Appendix B we show that under these assumptions, this extended model retains
all the key features of our baseline model.
4.2 Infinite Horizon Game
We end the paper by briefly discussing some properties of the infinite horizon game. We
start by noting that the infinite horizon game always has an SPE under which players
play strategies that depend on the history only through the status quo; i.e., a stationary
equilibrium always exists, regardless of whether the equilibrium of the finite horizon
game is convergent or cycling.
Let W = (W1,W2) be a fixed point of operator Φ (by Lemma 2, such a fixed point
always exists). It is easy to check that the following strategies constitute an SPE of the
infinitely repeated game: at any period t ∈ N with zt = z, player i = 1, 2 accepts policy
x ∈ X(z) if and only if x ∈ Ai,z(Wi). Player i’s payoff at the start of the game under
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this SPE is
Φi(W) = prob(x ∈ A(W))E[xi − (x1 + x2)δWi|x ∈ A(W)] + δWi = Wi.
This implies that, when the SPE of the finite horizon game is convergent, this SPE
converges as T →∞ to an SPE of the infinite horizon game.
Consider next the case in which the unique equilibrium of the finite horizon game
is cycling. Suppose further that payoffs W(T ) = ΦT+1(0) converge to a cycle of length
k ≥ 2, with payoffs W0, ...,Wk−1.7 In this case, the following strategies constitute an
SPE of the infinitely repeated game. At every period t with zt = z, player i = 1, 2
accepts policy x ∈ X(z) if and only if x ∈ Az(W t mod ki ). Under this SPE, player i’s
expected payoff at the start of the game is
Φi(W
0) = prob(x ∈ A(W0))E[xi − (x1 + x2)δW 0i |x ∈ A(W0)] + δW 0i = W 1i .
Therefore, when payoffs in the finite horizon game converge to a cycle, the infinite
horizon game also has an SPE with the same cycle.
5 Conclusion
We have developed a model of policy reform built on the assumption that players have
imperfect control over the proposals that are considered.
Our model suggests a new source of inefficient gridlock in the reform process, namely
the difficulty in finding moderate policies that are acceptable to both of the players that
are involved. In our model, the reform process is path dependent and may be cyclical as
the players alternate between being more and less accommodating. Inefficiency is driven
by the commitment problem, and cycling is driven by an alternating pattern of changes
in the players’ self-fulfilling expectations about the likelihood of enacting a reform.
Our model provides an answer to the question of how two bargainers approach the
Pareto frontier. They do so in steps, while ensuring that these steps fit within the set
of trajectories that ensure long-run moderation. In the symmetric case, as the players
become fully forward looking, the only acceptable trajectory is the one hypothesized by
Raiffa under which the players are guaranteed to achieve an equal split of the surplus.
7Recall that in Example 2, payoffs converge to a cycle of length 2 when δ = 0.5, and a cycle of
length 4 when δ = 0.75.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proofs for Section 2
Proof of Proposition 1. In the subgame starting in period T , it is optimal for both
players to accept any policy in X(zT ). Moreover, the policy that is drawn will remain
in place in all future periods so the payoff to each player i at this subgame is
Vi(z
T , T ;T ) = EzT [xi] (9)
where EzT [·] is the expectation operator under the distribution FzT .
At any subgame starting in period T − 1 with status quo policy zT−1, it is optimal
for player i to accept a policy x ∈ X(zT−1) if
(1− δ)xi + δVi(x, T ;T ) ≥ (1− δ)zT−1i + δVi(zT−1, T ;T ) (10)
So the set of policies that are acceptable to both players is
AzT−1 := {x ∈ X(zT−1) : (10) holds for both i = 1, 2}
This defines the payoff that each player i gets at such a subgame, which is
Vi(z
T−1, T − 1;T ) = prob(x ∈ AzT−1)EzT−1 [(1− δ)xi + δVi(x, T ;T ) |x ∈ AzT−1 ]
+ prob(x /∈ AzT−1)
[
(1− δ)zT−1i + δVi(xT−1, T ;T )
]
Repeating these arguments for all t < T establishes existence of a SPE, and uniqueness
of SPE payoffs.8 
Proof of Lemma 1. Recall that for all z ∈ X, Ez[·] is the expectation operator under
distribution Fz. Let E[·] be the expectation operator under distribution F(0,0) = F . We
prove the result by induction.
8Multiplicity of SPE arises since players are indifferent between accepting or rejecting when x is
such that (10) holds with equality. Since the set of such policies have measure zero, players obtain the
same expected payoffs in all SPE.
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Consider first a subgame starting at period t = T with status quo zT = z ∈ X. Note
that
Vi(z, T ;T ) = Ez[xi] = zi + (1− z1 − z2)E[xi],
where the first equality follows from equation (9) and the second equality follows from
Assumption 1.
Now, consider the policy reform game with deadline T = 0. By equation (9), player
i’s equilibrium payoffs satisfy Wi(0) = E[xi]. Hence,
Vi(z, T ;T ) = zi + (1− zi − zj)Wi(0)
which establishes the basis case.
For the induction step, suppose that (2) holds for all t such that T − t = 0, 1, ..., n−1
and for all z ∈ X. Fix a subgame starting at period t˜ with T − t˜ = n and with status
quo zt˜ = z ∈ X. Let Az(t˜) be the set of policies that both players accept at period t˜
when zt˜ = z; that is,
Az(t˜) =
{
x ∈ X(z) : (1− δ)xi + δVi(x, t˜+ 1;T ) ≥ (1− δ)zi + δVi(z, t˜+ 1;T ) for i = 1, 2
}
=
{
x ∈ X(z) : (xi − zi) ≥ (x1 + x2 − z1 + z2)δWi(T − t˜− 1) for i = 1, 2
}
,
where the second line follows since, by the induction hypothesis, (2) holds for t = t˜+ 1.
Note then that
Vi(z, t˜;T ) = prob(x ∈ Az(t˜))Ez
[
(1− δ)xi + δVi(x, t˜+ 1;T )
∣∣x ∈ Az(t˜)]
+ prob(x /∈ Az(t˜))
(
(1− δ)zi + δVi(z, t˜+ 1;T )
)
= prob(x ∈ Az(t˜))Ez
[
xi + (1− x1 − x2)δWi(T − t˜− 1)
∣∣z ∈ Az(t˜)]
+ prob(x /∈ Az(t˜))
(
zi + (1− z1 − z2)δWi(T − t˜− 1)
)
= prob(x ∈ Az(t˜))Ez
[
(xi − zi) + (z1 + z2 − x1 − x2)δWi(T − t˜− 1)
∣∣x ∈ Az(t˜)]
+ zi + (1− z1 − z2)δWi(T − t˜− 1) (11)
where the second equality follows since, by the induction hypothesis, (2) holds for t =
t˜+ 1, and the last inequality follows since prob(x /∈ Az(t˜)) = 1− prob(x ∈ Az(t˜)).
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Consider next a game with deadline T − t˜. Let A˜ be the set of policies that both
players accept at the first period of the game:
A˜ =
{
x ∈ X : (1− δ)xi + δVi(x, 1;T − t˜) ≥ δVi((0, 0), 1;T − t˜) for i = 1, 2
}
=
{
x ∈ X : xi ≥ (x1 + x2)δWi(T − t˜− 1) for i = 1, 2
}
,
where the second line follows since, by the induction hypothesis, for all Vi(x, 1;T − t˜) =
xi + (1− xi − xj)Wi(T − t˜) for all x. Player i’s payoff in this game is equal to
Wi(T − t˜) = prob(x ∈ A˜)E
[
(1− δ)xi + δVi(x, 1;T − t˜)
∣∣∣x ∈ A˜]+ prob(x /∈ A˜)δVi((0, 0), 1;T − t˜)
= prob(x ∈ A˜)E
[
xi − (x1 + x2)δWi(T − t˜− 1)
∣∣∣x ∈ A˜]+ δWi(T − t˜− 1)
(12)
Assumption 1 implies that
prob(x ∈ Az(t˜))Ez
[
xi − zi + (z1 + z2 − x1 − x2)δWi(T − t˜− 1)
∣∣x ∈ Az(t˜)]
=(1− z1 − z2)prob(x ∈ A˜)E
[
xi − (x1 + x2)δWi(T − t˜− 1)
∣∣∣x ∈ A˜] .
Combining this with (11) and (12),
Vi(z, t˜;T ) = zi + (1− z1 − z2)Wi(T − t˜).
which establishes the result. 
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) The proof is by induction. Consider the game with
deadline T = 0. Since it is optimal for both players to accept any policy x ∈ X that is
drawn, player i’s payoff in this game satisfies Wi(T ) = E[xi] = Φi((0, 0)).
Suppose next that Wi(τ) = Φ
τ+1
i ((0, 0)) for all τ = 0, ..., T − 1, and consider game
with deadline T . The set of policies that both players accept in the initial period are
given by
A˜ = {x ∈ X : (1− δ)xi + δVi(x, 1;T ) ≥ δVi((0, 0), 1;T ) for i = 1, 2}
= {x ∈ X : xi ≥ (x1 + x2)δWi(T − 1) for i = 1, 2} ,
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where the second line follows from Lemma 1. Player i’s payoff Wi(T ) satisfies
Wi(T ) = prob(x ∈ A˜)E
[
(1− δ)xi + δVi(x, 1;T )
∣∣∣x ∈ A˜]+ prob(x /∈ A˜)δVi((0, 0), 1;T )
= prob(x ∈ A˜)E
[
xi − (x1 + x2)δWi(T − 1)
∣∣∣x ∈ A˜]+ δWi(T − 1) (13)
where the equality follows after using Lemma 1. By the induction hypothesis, W(T −
1) = ΦT ((0, 0)), and so A˜ = A(ΦT ((0, 0))). Using this in (13), it follows that Wi(T ) =
Φ(ΦT ((0, 0))) = ΦT+1((0, 0)).
(ii) Fix a period t ≤ T and a policy z ∈ X, and consider a subgame starting at
period t with status quo policy zt = z. At such a subgame, player i finds it optimal to
accept policies x ∈ X(z) satisfying
(1− δ)xi + δVi(x, t+ 1;T ) ≥ (1− δ)zi + δVi(z, t+ 1;T )
or, using equation (2) in Lemma 1, policies that satisfy
xi − zi ≥ (x1 + x2 − z1 − z2)δWi(T − t− 1). (14)
The set of policies that both players accept at period t when the status quo is zt = z is
therefore the set of policies x ∈ X(z) for which (14) is satisfied for both i = 1, 2. This
is precisely the set Az(W(T − t− 1)) of policies defined in (4). 
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) Φ is continuous and maps X onto itself, so by Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem, it has a fixed point.
(ii) If {W(T )} converges to W, then Proposition 2(i) implies that
W = lim
T→∞
ΦT ((0, 0)) = Φ
(
lim
T→∞
ΦT−1((0, 0))
)
= Φ(W),
so W is a fixed-point of Φ. 
For every δ < 1, let Aδ(W) and Φδ be, respectively, the acceptance sets and the
operator defined in equation (5) when the discount factor is δ. Let Wδ = (W δ1 ,W
δ
2 ) be
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a fixed point of Φδ: for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
W δi = δW
δ
i + prob(x ∈ Aδ(Wδ))E[xi − (xi + xj)δW δi |x ∈ Aδ(Wδ)]
⇐⇒ W δi =
prob(x ∈ Aδ(Wδ))E[xi|x ∈ A(Wδ)]
1− δ + δprob(x ∈ Aδ(Wδ))E[xi + xj|x ∈ Aδ(Wδ)] .
Then,
W δ1 +W
δ
2 =
prob(x ∈ Aδ(Wδ))E[x1 + x2|x ∈ Aδ(Wδ)]
1− δ + δprob(x ∈ Aδ(Wδ))E[x1 + x2|x ∈ Aδ(Wδ)] . (15)
Lemma A.1. Fix a sequence of discount factors {δn} → 1, and let Wδn = (W δn1 ,W δn2 ) ∈
X be a sequence such that Wδn = Φδn(Wδn) for all n. Then, limn→∞(W δn1 +W
δn
2 ) = 1.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose this is not true. Hence, there exists a sequence
{δn} → 1 and a positive number η > 0 such that W δn1 +W δn2 < 1−η for all n. Note that
this implies that there is a set B with nonempty interior such that B ⊆ Aδn(Wδn) for
all n large enough. Therefore, prob(x ∈ Aδn(Wδn)) > prob(x ∈ B) > 0 for all n large
enough. It follows that
lim
n→∞
W δn1 +W
δn
2 = lim
n→∞
prob(x ∈ Aδn(Wδn))E[x1 + x2|x ∈ Aδn(Wδn)]
1− δn + δnprob(x ∈ Aδn(Wδn))E[x1 + x2|x ∈ Aδn(Wδn)] = 1,
a contradiction. Hence, it must be that W δn1 +W
δn
2 → 1 as δn → 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3. We start by showing that, for any δ < 1, there exists
V δ < 1 with δV δ → 1 as δ → 1 such that, for all W = (W1,W2) with W1 + W2 < V δ,
Φ1(W) + Φ2(W) > W1 +W2. Note that this property implies that, for any fixed point
Wδ = (W δ1 ,W
δ
2 ) of Φ
δ, it must be that V δ ≤ W δ1 +W δ2 .9
To see why such a V δ exists, pick g ∈ (0, f) with g < 1 and note that for any W ∈ X,
Φδ1(W) + Φ
δ
2(W) = δ(W1 +W2) + prob(x ∈ Aδ(W))E[x1 + x2|x ∈ Aδ(W)](1− δ(W1 +W2))
≥ δ(W1 +W2) + 1
3
f(1− δ(W1 +W2))2
> δ(W1 +W2) +
1
3
g(1− δ(W1 +W2))2, (16)
9If V δ > W δ1 +W
δ
2 , then Φ
δ
1(W
δ) + Φδ2(W
δ) > W δ1 +W
δ
2 , contradicting the fact that W
δ is a fixed
point of Φδ.
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where the first inequality follows since f(x) ≥ f > 0 for all x.10 Equation (16) implies
that Φδ1(W) + Φ
δ
2(W) > W1 +W2 for all W when
1
3
g
(1− δ(W1 +W2))2
1− δ > W1 +W2.
Let V δ be the smallest solution to 1
3
g (1−δV
δ)2
1−δ = V
δ; i.e.,
V δ =
3(1− δ)
2gδ2
(
1 +
2gδ
3(1− δ) −
√
1 +
4gδ
3(1− δ)
)
.
It follows that Φ1(W) + Φ2(W) > W1 + W2 for all W with W1 + W2 < V
δ. Note that
V δ < 1 for δ < 1, and that δV δ → 1 as δ → 1.
We show next that there exists δ < 1 such that, for all δ > δ and for all W =
(W1,W2) ∈ X with W1 + W2 ≥ V δ, (Φδ)T (W) converges to a fixed point of Φδ as
T →∞. Towards establishing this, note that for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
∂Φδi (W)
∂Wi
= δ − δ
∫
x∈Aδ(W)
(x1 + x2)f(x)dx ∈
[
δ − f
3
δ(1− δ(W1 +W2)), δ
]
∂Φδi (W)
∂Wj
= −
∫ 1−δWj
0
δx2i f
(
xi,
δWjxi
1− δWj
)
dxi
1− δ(W1 +W2)
(1− δWj)3 ∈
[
−f
3
δ(1− δ(W1 +W2)), 0
]
,
where we used the assumption that f(x) ≤ f for all x ∈ X. Since δV δ → 1 as δ → 1,
there exists δ < 1 such that, for all δ > δ and all W ∈ X with W1 + W2 ≥ δV δ, and
δ− 2f
3
δ(1−δ(W1+W2)) ≥ 0. Note that, for all δ > δ and all W ∈ X with W1+W2 ≥ δV δ
∂Φδi (W)
∂Wi
+
∂Φδi (W)
∂Wj
∈ (−δ, δ). (17)
Fix δ > δ, and let Y δ := {W ∈ X : W1 + W2 ≥ δV δ}. Let || · || be the sup-norm
on R2. By equation (17), for all W,W′ ∈ Y δ and for i = 1, 2, |Φi(W) − Φi(W′)| ≤
δ × ||W −W′||. Hence, for all W,W′ ∈ Y δ, ||Φ(W) − Φ(W′)|| ≤ δ × ||W −W′||.
10For all W ∈ X,
prob(x ∈ Aδ(W))E[x1 + x2|x ∈ Aδ(W)] =
∫
x∈Aδ(W)
(x1 + x2)f(x)dx
≥f
∫
x∈Aδ(W)
(x1 + x2)dx =
1
3
f(1− δ(W1 +W2)).
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Moreover, Φ(W) ∈ Y δ for all W ∈ Y δ.11 Note that this implies that, for all δ > δ and
for all W ∈ Y δ, (Φδ)T (W) converges to a fixed point of Φδ as T →∞.
Lastly, we show that the equilibrium is convergent whenever δ > δ. Fix δ > δ. There
are two cases to consider: (i) Φδ(0) ∈ Y δ, and (ii) Φδ(0) /∈ Y δ. In case (i), for any
deadline T ≥ 0, W(T ) = (Φδ)T (Φδ(0)) converges to a fixed point of Φδ as T →∞.
Consider next case (ii). Since Φδ1(W) + Φ2(W) > W1 + W2 for all W = (W1,W2)
with W1 + W2 < V
δ, there exists t ≥ 1 such that Φδ1((Φδ)t(0)) + Φ2((Φδ)t(0)) ≥ V δ.
Hence, by our arguments above, (Φδ)t+s(0) converges to a fixed point of Φδ as s→∞,
and so the equilibrium is convergent. 
Lemma A.2. If F is symmetric then the players have the same equilibrium payoffs for
all deadlines, i.e. W1(T ) = W2(T ) =: W (T ) for all T ≥ 0.
Proof. If F is symmetric, then
W1(0) = Φ1((0, 0)) = E[x1] = E[x2] = Φ2((0, 0)) = W2(0)
Now suppose that W1(t) = W2(t) for all t = 0, ..., T − 1. Then, W1(T − 1) = W2(T − 1)
implies that the set A((W1(T − 1),W2(T − 1)) is symmetric, i.e. if x = (x1, x2) ∈
A((W1(T − 1),W2(T − 1)) then (x2, x1) ∈ A((W1(T − 1),W2(T − 1)). Then, we have
W1(T ) = Φ1(W(T − 1))
= prob(x ∈ A(W(T − 1))E[x1 − (x1 + x2)W1(T − 1)|x ∈ A(W(T − 1))] + δW1(T − 1)
= prob(x ∈ A(W(T − 1))E[x2 − (x1 + x2)W2(T − 1)|x ∈ A(W(T − 1))] + δW2(T − 1)
= Φ2(W(T − 1)) = W2(T ),
11Proof: Note that the function G(V ) = δV + 13g(1− δV )2 is increasing in V whenever δ − 23gδ(1−
δV ) ≥ 0. Then, since δ − 23δg(1 − δ(W1 + W2)) > δ − 23fδ(1 − δ(W1 + W2)) ≥ 0 for all δ ≥ δ and all
W ∈ Y δ, it follows that,
Φδ1(W) + Φ
δ
2(W) ≥ δ(W1 +W2) +
1
3
g(1− δ(W1 +W2))2
≥ δV δ + 1
3
g(1− δV δ)2 = V δ,
for all δ ≥ δ and all W ∈ Y δ. Hence, for all δ ≥ δ and all W ∈ Y δ, Φ(W) ∈ Y δ.
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where the third equality follows since W1(T −1) = W2(T −1) and since F is symmetric.

Proof of Proposition 4. For any Wˆ ∈ [0, 1], define
H(Wˆ ) := prob(x ∈ A(Wˆ ))E[x1 + x2|x ∈ A(Wˆ )],
so that Ψ(Wˆ ) = δWˆ +H(Wˆ )(1−δWˆ ). Note that H ′(Wˆ ) ≤ 0: indeed, Wˆ ′′ > Wˆ ′ implies
that A(Wˆ ′′) ⊂ A(Wˆ ′), so for any Wˆ ′′ > Wˆ ′,
prob(x ∈ A(Wˆ ′′))E[x1 + x2|x ∈ A(Wˆ ′′)] ≤ prob(x ∈ A(Wˆ ′))E[x1 + x2|x ∈ A(Wˆ ′)].
It then follows that Ψ′(Wˆ ) = δ(1−H(Wˆ )) +H ′(Wˆ )(1− δWˆ ) ≤ δ < 1 for all Wˆ ∈ [0, 1].
When Ψ′(Wˆ ) > −1 for all Wˆ ∈ [0, 1], |Ψ′(Wˆ )| < 1 for all Wˆ ∈ [0, 1]. This implies that
Ψ is a contraction, and the sequence {Wˆ (T )} converges to its unique fixed point. Hence,
the equilibrium is convergent. 
A.2 Proofs for Section 3.2
Proof of Lemma 3. Fix any τ ≥ t. Since xτ+1 ∈ Axτ (W) we have
xτ+1i ≥ `i,xτ (xτ+1−i |Wi) = xτi +
δWi
1− δWi (x
τ+1
−i − xτ−i)
for both i = 1, 2. For any y = (y1, y2) ∈ Axτ+1(W), add y−iδWi/(1− δWi) to both sides
of the above inequality and rearrange to get
xτ+1i +
δWi
1− δWi (y−i − x
τ+1
−i ) ≥ xτi +
δWi
1− δWi (y−i − x
τ
−i)
This means that
`i,xτ+1(y−i|Wi) ≥ `i,xτ (y−i|Wi), i = 1, 2. (18)
Thus if y ∈ Axτ+1(W) then yi ≥ `i,xτ+1(y−i|W−i) for i = 1, 2, and by (18), yi ≥
`i,xτ (y−i|Wi) for i = 1, 2. This means that y ∈ Axτ (W), and thus Axτ+1(W) ⊆ Axτ (W).

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Proof of Proposition 5. For each z ∈ X, define LRz := Az(W)∩{y ∈ X : y1 + y2 =
1}. Since distribution Fz has full support and since LRz ⊆ Az(W), any point in LRz
can arise as a long term outcome; i.e., LRz ⊆ suppGz.
Consider next a subgame starting at period t with zt = z. By Lemma 3, xτ ∈ Az(W)
for all τ ≥ t. Since LRz = Az(W)∩{z ∈ X : y1+y2 = 1}, any point on the frontier that
is not in LRz cannot arise as a long term outcome when z
t = z. Hence, suppGz ⊆ LRz.
This establishes that suppGz = LRz, and it follows that Gz 6= Gz′ for z 6= z′. Lemma
3 then implies that along a realized equilibrium path {xτ}∞τ=t, we have suppGxτ+1 ⊆
suppGxτ . The inclusion is strict when x
τ+1 6= xτ since LRxτ+1 6= LRxτ in this case. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Fix a sequence {δn} with δn → 1. For each n, let Wδn =
(W δn1 ,W
δn
2 ) be the players’ equilibrium payoffs in the limit as T → ∞ in a game with
discount factor δn. By Lemma 2, for each n, W
δn is a fixed point of Φδn . By Lemma
A.1, {Wδn} is such that limn→∞W δn1 +W δn2 = 1. This establishes part (iii).
Consider next part (i). By Proposition 5, for each n the support of the long-run
distribution Gδn is
A(W) ∩ {y ∈ X : y1 + y2 = 1} = {x ∈ X : x1 + x2 = 1 and x1 ∈ [δW δn1 , 1− δW δn2 ]}.
By part (iii), δn(W
δn
1 + W
δn
2 ) converges to 1 as n → ∞. Hence, [δnW δn1 , 1 − δnW δn2 ]
converges to a point W ∗1 , and so G
δn converges to a dirac measure on (W ∗1 ,W
∗
2 ).
Finally, recall that
Aδn(Wδn) =
{
x ∈ X : xi ≥ δnW
δn
i
1− δnW δni
x−i for i = 1, 2
}
.
Using part (iii), Aδn(Wδn) converges to {x ∈ X : x1/x2 = W ∗1 /W ∗2 }. 
Proof of Proposition 7. First we prove that if F is symmetric then the fixed point
of Ψ is unique. Operator Ψ is continuous and maps [0, 1] onto itself, so by Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem, it has a fixed point.
Let Wˆ be a fixed point of Ψ. Then, Wˆ satisfies
Wˆ =
prob(x ∈ A(Wˆ ))E[x1 + x2|x ∈ A(Wˆ )]
1− δ + δprob(x ∈ A(Wˆ ))E[x1 + x2|x ∈ A(Wˆ )]
. (19)
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Note that A(Wˆ ′′) ⊂ A(Wˆ ′) for any Wˆ ′′ > Wˆ ′. Therefore, for any Wˆ ′′ > Wˆ ′,
prob(x ∈ A(Wˆ ′′))E[x1 + x2|x ∈ A(Wˆ ′′)] ≤ prob(x ∈ A(Wˆ ′))E[x1 + x2|x ∈ A(Wˆ ′)].
Thus, the right side of (19) is decreasing in Wˆ , and so Ψ has a unique fixed point.
Next, the sum of the players’ equilibrium payoff in a game with deadline T is
Wˆ (T ) = ΨT+1(0). By standard results in dynamical systems (e.g., Theorem 4.2 in
De la Fuente (2000)), under conditions (i) and (ii) in the statement of the proposition
the sequence {Wˆ (T )} does not converge. So the equilibrium must be cycling. 
B Strategic search
In this appendix we study the extension described in Section 4.1. We start by noting
that this game has an essentially unique SPE – this can be established using the same
arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1.
Fix a deadline T and a SPE σ∗. For every time t ≤ T and any z ∈ X, let Vi(z, t;T )
by player i’s SPE continuation payoff at period t in a game with deadline T when the
status quo policy at time t is z. Let Wi(T ) denote player i’s equilibrium payoff at the
start of the game.
Recall that we made the following assumptions on the sets of distributions Fx. First,
for all x,y ∈ X, card(Fx) = card(Fy); i.e., all the sets Fx have the same cardinality.
Second, for all x ∈ X and all Fx ∈ Fx with density fx, there exists F ∈ F = F(0,0) with
density f such that fx(y) = f(Px(y)) for all y ∈ X(x). We further assume that there
exists f > f > 0 such that f(x) ∈ [f, f ] for all x ∈ X. Note that these assumptions are
a generalization of Assumption 1 to the current environment.
The following result generalizes Lemma 1 to the current environment. The proof is
identical to the proof of Lemma 1, and hence omitted.
Lemma B.1. For all t ≤ T and all zt = z = (z1, z2) ∈ X,
Vi(z, t;T ) = zi + (1− z1 − z2)Wi(T − t). (20)
Lemma B.1 can be used to obtain a recursive characterization of equilibrium payoffs.
Consider a period t ≤ T at which the status quo policy is z = (z1, z2) ∈ X. As in our
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baseline model, player i approves a policy x = (x1, x2) ∈ X(z) only if
(1− δ)xi + δVi(x, t+ 1;T ) ≥ (1− δ)zi + δVi(z, t+ 1;T )
xi + (1− x1 − x2)δWi(T − t− 1) ≥ zi − (1− x1 − x2)δWi(T − t− 1),
where we used Lemma B.1. Let Wi = Wi(T − t− 1). Then, at period t player i accepts
policy x when the status quo is z only if xi ∈ Ai,z(Wi) = {x ∈ X(z) : xi ≥ `i,z(x−i|Wi)},
where `i,z(x−i|Wi) is defined as in the main text. For any pair of payoffs W = (W1,W2)
and for any z ∈ X, the set Az(W) defined in the main text is the set of policy draws
that are accepted by both players at period t < T when the status quo policy is z and
(W1(T − t− 1),W2(T − t− 1)) = (W1,W2).
Consider a game with deadline T . Suppose player i = 1, 2 is recognized to choose
the distribution from which the policy will be drawn at the initial period. If player i
chooses distribution F ∈ F , she obtains payoffs equal to
probF (x ∈ A(W(T − 1)))EF [xi− (x1 + x2)δWi(T − 1)|x ∈ A(W(T − 1))] + δWi(T − 1).
For any W ∈ X and for i = 1, 2, let
F ∗W,i ∈ arg max
F∈F
probF (x ∈ A(W))EF [xi − (x1 + x2)Wi|x ∈ A(W)],
and let F ∗W :=
1
2
F ∗W,1 +
1
2
F ∗W,2. Note that, when W(T − 1) = W, the initial period
policy is drawn from distribution F ∗W.
Define the operator Γ : X → X as follows: for i = 1, 2 and for all W ∈ X,
Γi(W) = probF ∗W(x ∈ A(W))EF ∗W [xi − (x1 + x2)δWi|x ∈ A(W)] + δWi.
For any integer t, let Γt denote the t-th iteration of operator Γ.
For any integer T , let W(T ) denote the players’ SPE payoffs in a game with deadline
T . The following result extends Proposition 2 to the current environment – the proof
uses the same arguments as the proof of Proposition 2, and hence we omit it.
Proposition B.1. In the equilibrium of the policy reform game with endogenous pro-
posals and deadline T ,
(i) the players’ equilibrium values satisfy W(T ) = ΓT+1((0, 0)), and
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(ii) the set of policies that are accepted by both players in any period t ≤ T is Azt(W(T−
t−1)) where zt is the status quo policy in period t and W(T−t−1) are the players’
equilibrium payoffs in the policy reform game with deadline T − t− 1.
This characterization of equilibrium payoffs can be used to generalize the main results
in the main text to the current environment. First, the equilibrium features inefficient
delays. Second, when the equilibrium is convergent, the acceptance regions are nested,
and the distribution over long-run outcomes that the equilibrium induces at a subgame
starting with status quo payoff z has support equal to {y ∈ X : y1 + y2 = 1} ∩
Az(W). Therefore, the equilibrium also displays path-dependence. It can be shown
that Proposition 6 continues to hold in this setting, so the equilibrium outcome also
becomes deterministic in the limit as δ → 1. Finally, the game with strategic proposals
can also give rise to cycling equilibria.12
12The proofs of all of these results are available upon request.
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